On Disgust and Moral Judgments: A Review

Authors

  • Cristina-Elena Ivan Lund University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5334/jeps.cq

Keywords:

disgust, moral judgments, emotion, cognition, morality

Abstract

While there is a continuing debate on whether cognitive or emotional mechanisms underlie moral judgments, recent studies have illustrated that emotions—particularly disgust—play a prominent role in moral reasoning. This review explores the role of disgust in moral judgments. I distinguish between three relevant claims regarding its involvement in moral cognition and argue that the least appealing (i.e., disgust is just anger in disguise) is also the one with the least empirical support.  

Author Biography

Cristina-Elena Ivan, Lund University

Master of Science student in Psychology, Department of Psychology

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Published

2015-04-30

Issue

Section

Literature Review